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1 Introduction 
When the British Electoral Commission officially announced the British people’s de-
cision to leave the European Union on the morning of 24 June 2016, some politicians 
were already planning ahead. As early as the night before the disclosure of the final 
voting results, Marine Le Pen, like other eurosceptic politicians, had turned to Twit-
ter construing Brexit as the opportunity to put an end to European integration alto-
gether: “Victory of liberty! As I have asked for years, we must now have the same re-
ferendum in France and in the countries of the European Union“ (Chan, 2016). 
Yet the likelihood of such a development after Brexit was not uncontested in the Eu-
ropean population. In a survey conducted in the week following the referendum, a 
majority of German citizens indeed expected the EU to start afresh on new foundati-
ons and emerge strengthened from the Brexit crisis (Ifop, 2016a). French citizens, on 
the other hand, were substantially less likely to anticipate a strengthening of the 
Union, while somewhat more respondents than in Germany expected other countries 
to follow the United Kingdom's path, leading to the breakdown of the Union (ibid.). 
The present paper seizes on this finding of conspicuous differences between the 
French and German nationals by attempting to investigate its causes. More precisely, 
it examines in how far the differing expectations regarding the future of European 
integration can be traced back to respective framings in French and German media 
coverage after the Brexit vote. The research question can be formulated as follows:  
The interest of such an analysis stems from both empirical and theoretical conside-
rations. First, Brexit is a unique occurrence in the history of European integration, 
the consequences of which still remain largely unknown (Åslund & Djankov, 2017, p. 
11). Nevertheless, indications for the presumption can be found that French and 
German people’s expectations of the EU’s future after Brexit may influence the real 
“Why do expectations as to the future of European integration after Brexit 
differ substantially between Germany and France and, more specifically, 
which significance could media framing have in explaining this curiosity?“
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developments taking place in this regard. For instance, Krizan and Sweeny (2013) 
showed that supporters of a public ballot initiative were more likely to turn out to 
vote if they maintained optimistic about the initiative’s passage and thus its realiza-
tion (p. 713). In the elections conducted in France and Germany in the year after the 
referendum, such a “motivating power of positive expectations“ (ibid.) can be equally 
expected to play, or in the case of France, to have played a significant part. 
In both countries, issues of European integration are likely to be of central import-
ance and therefore carry some weight in the citizens’ decision of supporting one 
candidate or party rather than another. Whether a citizen, however, effectively takes 
the trouble to cast a ballot for this party on election day may, based broadly on the 
concept outlined above, depend on how likely he or she considers the party’s propo-
sition for European integration to be indeed feasible and put into practice. 
While this paper does not assert that the entirety of the electorate is or was impac-
ted by such mechanisms, as probably not all citizens make their voting decision ba-
sed on specific issues, at least for parts such considerations may play a role. Therefo-
re, it can be assumed that future expectations as regards the EU have some influence 
in the elections and thus on whose propositions can be realized more likely than 
others. This is relevant even more so in Germany and France, as both are considered 
the central powers in shaping the Union’s future (Hendricks & Morgan, 2001, p. 4). 
An additional relevance of the paper arises out of a certain gap in literature. As will 
be outlined in more detail in the second chapter, only little research has so far been 
conducted on the impact of media framing in the context of European integration. 
Furthermore, none of these studies have dealt with citizens’ expectations or the con-
text of the Brexit decision. The present paper attempts to bridge this gap and thus 
contributes to the literature on both framing and the EU. 
The analysis proceeds in four main steps. First, the existing studies in the paper’s 
area of research are reviewed and discussed (ch. 2). Second, the theory and method 
of the analysis are presented, including a more thorough examination of the survey 
underlying the paper and an explanation of the frames searched for in the media 
content (ch. 3 and 4). This is followed, third, by the presentation of the study’s re-
Framing the Future of European Integration after Brexit !3
sults (ch. 5) and finally, fourth, by a conclusion and outlook (ch. 6). For the purpose 
of an indicative overview, the analysis will proceed along the lines of so-called de-
ductive frame analyses, attempting to trace predefined elements in a given media 
content. Four French and German leading quality newspapers are examined for the 
prominence of articles emphasizing either a potential revivification of European in-
tegration in the context of Brexit or a potential paralysis in, or even regression of, 
the same. The results of this investigation are then put into relation with the survey 
results in search for resemblances and potential links pointing towards an effect. 
While the paper will not be able to investigate and prove any kind of media impact 
empirically, the detection of parallels between framing and the expectations of 
French and German citizens would strongly suggest a connection between both as-
pects. This is due to both theoretical arguments and prior empirical findings regar-
ding media influence, which are outlined in the course of this paper. 
2 Literature and conceptual clarifications 
2.1    Framing studies 
Since the first half of the 1990s, framing studies have experienced a “dramatic 
growth“ (Weaver, 2007, p. 143) in disciplines such as sociology, communication sci-
ence, political science and psychology. This has lead to an “intimidating multiplicity 
of approaches and definitions“ (Campbell, 2009, p. 57) as to what the terms frames 
and framing describe. In one of the most frequently quoted definitions, Entman 
(1993) denotes framing in the following manner: “To frame is to select some aspects 
of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a 
way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral eva-
luation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described“ (p. 52). 
Other definitions reflect a broader understanding. Helbling, Höglinger and Wüest 
(2008), for instance, suggest that while frames can be understood as schemata or 
“systems that guide our perception of reality — framing refers to the more or less 
consciously managed process, by which these schemata are manufactured, selected, 
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distributed and adopted“ (p. 8). Overall, two main characteristics of frames have 
been identified as recurrent in most of the literature: (1) Frames are patterns of in-
terpretation which select and emphasize some aspects of reality while ignoring 
others and (2) frames connect the aspects mentioned in a specific way (Kühne, 2015, 
p. 25). This definition will serve as the basis for the present analysis. 
So far, frames and framing have been investigated primarily at four levels (Matthes 
& Kohring, 2004, p. 56; Scheufele, 2004, p. 30): (1) at the level of political and socie-
tal actors attempting to launch their interpretations in the public debate, (2) at the 
level of journalists selecting and composing news in a particular way, (3) at the level 
of media content reflecting specific angles of reporting, and (4) at the level of recipi-
ents with their individual “mentally stored clusters of ideas“ (Entman, 1993, p. 53). 
Symptomatic of framing studies generally, but especially of the fourth perspective of 
analyses, is a notion of effect. According to the approach, framing is relevant because 
the way an issue is presented has a common impact “on large portions of the recei-
ving audience“ (ibid., p. 54). Although the measurement of framing effects has been 
contested by some researchers, numerous studies have confirmed this hypothesis, 
notably as far as frames in the media are concerned (Leeper & Slothuus, 2015, p. 2). 
For instance, Brinson and Stohl (2012) demonstrated experimentally that framings 
of the 2005 London bombings in terms of “homegrown terrorism“ lead to more fear 
and support for restricting Muslims’ civil liberties than framing of the attacks as “in-
ternational terrorism“. In a different context, Brewer (2008) demonstrated that indi-
viduals exposed to an article stressing the principle of equality became more suppor-
tive of the rights of homosexuals, and less supportive if it emphasized morality.  
Framing, and specifically media framing, has thus been widely accepted to be influ-
ential. In fact, much of its power has been said to come “from its ability to define the 
terms of a debate without the audience realizing its taking place“ (Tankard, 2001, p. 
97). While the media framing perspective is therefore more and more prominent in 
research overall, it is still surprisingly underrepresented in certain areas of research 
(Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 258). Such an observation is valid, among others, for 
the field of European integration (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006, p. 5). 
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2.2    European integration and Brexit 
European integration can be understood as the peaceful and voluntary convergence 
of European societies, states and economies (Weidenfeld, 2011, p. 15). Although the 
integration in Europe is not limited to the European Union, the term has been pre-
dominantly used in literature in order to describe processes relating to the EU. This 
conceptualization also appears appropriate for the present study. 
Considering historic developments, the characteristics of European integration have 
been notably described in terms of an increasing transferral of competences to the 
European level, a shift of focus from mere economic to more political matters and an 
increasing role for the European populations (De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009, p. 454). 
Over the time, the European Union has thereby developed into what can be broadly 
described as “a new form of supranational polity, which combines features of federal 
states and intergovernmental organizations“ (Díez Medrano, 2003, p. 3). 
If one considers the literature published in the field of European integration, a still 
only limited number of studies has so far addressed media framing, although this re-
search interest gradually appears to become more important (Helbling et al., 2008, p. 
2). For instance, De Vreese (2003) analyzed how media reports frame issues of Eu-
ropean integration either in terms of conflict or in regards to economic implications. 
Other studies were conducted by Díez Medrano (2003) and Trenz (2005), the latter 
examining whether arguments used in media coverage of the European Union are 
related rather to interest, value or identity. 
However, the literature still mostly focuses on other aspects relating to political in-
tegration in Europe. Among these are the behavior of the electorate in European 
elections, the positioning of political actors and citizens towards the EU, and the Eu-
ropean Union as an issue of the public debate (Helbling et al., 2008, p. 2). For examp-
le, Hix and Marsh (2007) demonstrated that the European populations use the elec-
tions for the European Parliament mainly to punish their national governments. Ko-
opmans (2007), on the other hand, showed that Europeanization has led to a greater 
role for governmental and executive actors in public debates. 
Framing the Future of European Integration after Brexit !6
Some of these studies have employed the framework of framing and are thus of par-
ticular interest to the present paper. For example, Helbling et al. (2008) have investi-
gated how various national political parties frame the European integration process, 
Statham and Gray (2005) analyzed how political actors in the United Kingdom for-
mulate their relationship to Europe, showing that EU supporters mainly emphasize 
economic arguments, and Díez Medrano (2003) indicates that opponents of the EU 
largely employ frames of sovereignty and national identity to devaluate the Union. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, genuine media framing studies still remain ra-
ther underrepresented. This is also the case as regards the growing literature on 
Brexit as a particular and incisive occurrence in the course of European integration 
(Papageorgiou, 2016). Frequently interpreted as the “biggest shock to hit the EU in-
stitutions since the creation of the European Economic Community“ (Åslund & 
Djankov, 2017, p. 10), the British people’s vote in favor of leaving the European Uni-
on in June 2016 has so far been mostly analyzed either with regard to the drivers and 
explanations of the result or to the future relationship between the UK and the EU. 
Despite this, at least a limited number of studies could be identified dealing with po-
tential consequences of Brexit for the European Union, thereby thematically approa-
ching this paper’s research interest. Koenig (2016), for instance, looked into different 
hypotheses as to the future development of the EU’s common foreign and security 
policy. However, media framing or even framing generally is, up to the present mo-
ment and to the author’s best knowledge, absent from this particular research area. 
2.3    Media effects 
A third set of studies that should be reviewed concerns the effects of media on indi-
viduals. While parts of this literature, namely the work on the effects of media 
frames, has already been addressed above, media effects studies, in general, address 
any change in knowledge, emotions, attitudes and behavior that can be directly or 
indirectly linked to media consumption (Schweiger, 2013, p. 19). Most of these stu-
dies are organized along particular theoretical strands, such as agenda setting, pri-
ming effects, cultivation theory, the “spiral of silence“, as well as framing theory. 
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Agenda setting studies, for example, analyze how the media influences the relevance 
individuals attribute to certain issues. Most notably, American researchers McCombs 
and Shaw (1972) theorized that “mass media set the agenda for each political cam-
paign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues“ (p. 177). The 
authors found evidence for this approach in an analysis of media coverage and public 
surveys in the context of the 1968 US presidential election. 
Cultivation studies, on the other hand, investigate how the consumption of televisi-
on broadcasts impacts individuals’ perceptions of social reality. Gerbner and Gross 
(1967), for instance, showed that the perceptions reported by people consuming a lot 
of fictional television often coincided with the images portrayed in such TV pro-
grams. Studies on the “spiral of silence“, finally, have indicated that individuals are 
more likely to express their opinion on a certain issue if it corresponds to the positi-
on reported predominantly in mass media (see e.g. Glynn, Hayes & Shanahan, 1997). 
While the scope of this paper does not permit a detailed analysis of the entire media 
effects literature, it can be noted that an impact of media content has been frequent-
ly shown to be generally plausible but effectively conditional upon certain factors. 
Among these are, for instance, the characteristics of the audience: Scheufele and 
Tewksbury (2007), for instance, showed that low levels of political knowledge often 
yield higher susceptibility to effects of political media coverage.  
Zaller (1992), on the other hand, emphasized that media reporting needs a clear and 
consistent tendency to have an impact, a concept he called “one-sided information 
flow“. Page and Shapiro (1992) furthermore suggested that media effects should be 
expected primarily if the issues reported are remote from personal experience be-
cause, in these cases, other sources for the formation of attitudes are not available. 
A very limited number of studies have investigated these effects and their conditio-
nality in the context of European integration. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006), 
for example, showed that citizens exposed to news coverage presenting the enlar-
gement of the European Union in a positive way showed higher levels of support for 
such enlargements. However, this was only true in cases in which news media cover-
age on the issue was considerable in amount and had a coherent evaluative tone. 
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Some of these studies have furthermore used framing as their theoretical framework, 
similarly to the present paper. In particular, De Vreese and Kandyla (2009) analyzed 
how the framing of the common EU foreign and security policy in terms of “risk“ or 
“opportunity“ affected public support. Using a survey-embedded experiment, they 
found that participants exposed to the “risk“ frame were less likely to support such 
policies, especially if they also reported to be afraid of globalization. 
Schuck and De Vreese (2006) examined the same frames in the context of EU enlar-
gement and found similar results. In line with Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), they 
additionally demonstrated that individuals with less political knowledge were more 
affected by “risk“ or “opportunity“ frames. Existing literature thus generally appears 
to back the hypothesis that media framing has a potential impact on the public’s at-
titudes regarding European integration. However, the studies at hand have so far al-
most exclusively focused on current attitudes and opinions in this area, while the 
present study will propose a new angle by addressing future expectations. 
3 Theoretical approach 
3.1    Point of departure 
Before setting out the main theoretical approach and assumptions of the present 
analysis, it is appropriate to provide more thorough information on the paper’s point 
of departure. As has been briefly alluded to in the introduction, the study’s research 
interest mainly stems from a poll conducted in the week after the UK referendum in 
altogether six EU countries, among others Germany and France. This survey “Les Eu-
ropéens et le Brexit“, carried out by French polling institute Ifop (2016a), revealed 
considerable differences between French and German citizens in regards to the ex-
pectations for future European integration after Brexit. 
While German participants reported a certain optimism as to the future of the EU, 
more than half of the respondents expecting a strengthening of the Union after the 
Brexit crisis, French citizens were much more skeptical. Only about a third of these 
agreed with the German perspective, whereas a larger number than on the other side 
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of the Rhine river anticipated a breakdown of the European Union. As this is the key 
finding the present study builds on, a closer examination of the results is in order. 
To begin with, the substantiality and significance of the differences highlighted by 
the survey should be examined. In the case of the strengthening perspective (left co-
lumns), this will likely not be called into question, the margin of error reported 
amounting to 3.1 points at the most (Ifop, 2016a, p. 3; confidence interval of 95 per-
cent). On the other hand, the significance of the gap in the disappearance response 
(right columns) is more likely to encounter challenges. However, several factors back 
the thesis that, also in this regard, the differences indicated by the survey hold true. 
First, a follow-up survey conducted in November 2016 by the same polling institute 
confirmed the results. While the percentage of German participants expecting an EU 
breakdown remained at 27, the number of French citizens responding in this way 
even rose to 36 percent, hereby increasing the gap between Germans and French to 9 
percentage points (Ifop, 2016b, p. 23). On the other hand, the dissimilarities in re-
gards to the strengthening perspective remained almost identical to the initial poll.  
Second, surveys presented by other institutes yielded differences similar to those 
demonstrated. In particular, a poll conducted by the British opinion research institu-
te YouGov from June to July 2016 showed that French were more numerous to expect 
a domino effect than German respondents. Asked whether they estimated likely that 
other countries will leave following the UK’s exit, 58 percent of French citizens re-
sponded in the affirmative, whereas 29 percent judged such developments unlikely 
Figure 1: Survey results regarding the expectations for European integration 
source: based on Ifop, 2016a, p. 58
France Germany
54 %
37 %“The EU will start 







32 % “Other countries 
will leave the EU, 
leading to its 
disappearance.“
sample of 1000 German and 1004 French citizens (a.o.) · 
interviews conducted from 28 June 2016 to 6 July 2016
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(Schmidt, 2016). On the other hand, only 50 percent of German respondents expec-
ted further exits, while 36 percent estimated this to be improbable (ibid.). 
Finally, the Eurobarometer survey of November 2016 attested that French citizens 
were also generally less optimistic about the EU’s future than Germans. While 50 
percent of German respondents expressed optimism, only 41 percent of French citi-
zens gave this answer and 56 percent even expressed pessimism (European Commis-
sion, 2016, p. 105). What is particularly interesting, these proportions were still in-
verted in the May 2016 survey, thus before the Brexit referendum, when a slightly 
higher share of French, as opposed to Germans, expressed optimism (ibid.). 
Having reviewed these polls, it not only appears probable that both differences poin-
ted out by the Ifop survey do indeed reflect actual and significant differences bet-
ween the respective populations’ expectations, but it also emerges as very likely that 
factors or considerations in the context of the Brexit vote had a substantial influence 
on provoking and shaping the differences. In this regard, the present paper seizes to 
assess the potential impact of one specific of those factors, namely media framing.  
3.2    General approach and substantiation 
At its core, this paper attempts to draw empirically corroborated conclusions on 
whether the differences between French and German citizens regarding expectations 
for future European integration after Brexit can indeed be plausibly traced back to 
respective media framings in the two countries after the Brexit vote. If one wanted to 
formulate the assumptions guiding the analysis, they would be the following: 
(1) The higher share of EU optimism shared by German, in contrast to French, citi-
zens stems from the more optimistic coverage of the EU’s future in German media 
after the Brexit referendum. (2) On the other hand, the greater levels of eurosceptic 
expectations among French, in contrast to German, citizens is linked to a greater si-
gnificance of EU pessimistic framing in France after the Brexit referendum. 
At the outset and prior to results of the present analysis, support for these general 
assumptions derives from mainly four points. First, as Page and Shapiro (1992) have 
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argued, mass media is very likely to have an impact on citizens in areas that are re-
mote from personal experience. This is particularly relevant in the case of European 
integration, as citizens have little other possibility to learn about EU affairs than 
through media, making them potentially susceptible to framing effects (Azrout, Van 
Spanje & De Vreese, 2012, p. 693). Surveys such as the Eurobarometer have substan-
tiated this claim, showing that the media is citizens’ main source of information 
about the EU (European Commission, 2016, pp. 190-192).  
Second, support stems from a number of studies which have, in the past, demonstra-
ted that mass media indeed impacts perceptions and attitudes towards the European 
Union. As outlined in more detail in the second chapter, several analyses have found 
that framing in media coverage has had an influence, for example, on support for 
specific European policies or EU enlargement. Such studies build an empirical foun-
dation for this paper’s analysis, working in a similar direction. 
Third, especially as regards future expectations, a strong theoretical case for a media 
framing influence can be made. While current opinions and attitudes may be “based 
on low-information rationality“ (Sheafer & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010, p. 207), such as 
party identification, researches have argued that the formation of future expectati-
ons reflects a complex cognitive decision-making process requiring high levels of 
information. This information is supposedly gathered largely through the media as it 
“provides rich information about future developments“ (ibid.). The hypothesis resul-
ting from such a consideration, namely that future expectations are affected to a lar-
ger extent by media frames than current attitudes, has been confirmed in an empiri-
cal study, providing further backing for this paper’s approach (ibid, p. 210). 
Finally, fourth, the Brexit vote arguably provides a particularly favorable context for 
a media influence regarding the aspects mentioned. As the referendum creates a si-
tuation of great uncertainty as to future integration of the European Union, citizens 
are likely to be induced to actively seek information, for instance from the media, in 
order to form their expectations. Simultaneously, after the referendum, media out-
lets are very likely to extensively cover prospects for the future of the EU, rendering 
it probable that the public will indeed come into contact with the relevant contents. 
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On the other hand, a number of arguments can be suggested which challenge the 
possibility of a media impact in the given context and propose alternative explanati-
ons for the results brought forward in the Ifop survey. Most notably, one could sug-
gest that the differences in expectations between French and German citizens simply 
stem from lower levels of overall EU support in France, negatively influencing the 
response behavior as to EU integration anticipations. If proven, this would annul the 
puzzle and therefore render untenable an assumption of media influence. Yet in the 
present context, such straightforward presumptions are difficult to maintain. 
First, theoretically, there is no obvious relationship between support for European 
integration and expectations in regards to the same. It is very well conceivable that a 
person is critical of the European Union but still anticipates it to last. More import-
antly, however, the detailed results of the Ifop survey indicate that even if one con-
siders only those respondents who regard the membership of their country in the EU 
to be favorable, Germans remain by 15 percentage points more optimistic as to a 
strengthening of the EU than French respondents (Ifop, 2016a, pp. 60-62). Therefore, 
the puzzle, and thus the potential for a media influence, largely remains. 
In spite of this, the share of the strengthening expectation in both Germany and 
France is substantially more elevated among EU friendly respondents in the survey, 
hinting indeed at a certain interrelation between EU support and this anticipation 
(ibid.). However, neither does this link appear comprehensive and exhaustive, nor 
can the direction of a potential influence be inferred based on this data. 
As another possibility, one might suggest that the different expectations in France 
and Germany as to future European integration are rather due to framings issued by 
political elites of the respective countries than to frames in the media. Due to the 
power and position of the politicians, their assessments of the situation may appear 
credible and thus exercise an influence on the citizens. However, it should be con-
sidered that “political actors’ statements typically do not get direct public 
attention“ (Helbling et al., 2008, p. 9). Instead, the statements must be selected by 
the media in order to be noticed by the broader public and are thus potentially sub-
ject to re-framings of the journalists (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is likely in the context of 
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the Brexit vote that the media’s framings of future European integration are at least 
partly based on statements issued by politicians. In order to examine this, alongside 
the frames of the media coverage, their main sources will be recorded in the analysis, 
as well. Yet all in all, it can legitimately be stated that initial theoretical and empiri-
cal considerations rather support than refute the approach presented. 
3.3    Frames examined and respective expectations 
So far, it has been set forth that media framing in Germany and France after the 
Brexit vote is expected to have varied in terms of optimism or skepticism towards 
future European integration and that these framings may explain the puzzling diffe-
rences in expectations between German and French citizens. In this section, the ap-
proach will be refined. In particular, this paper suggests that the presence of mainly 
two specific frames in the media lead to the variations in citizens’ anticipations. 
The nature and descriptions of these frames are based in large parts on the response 
options found in the 2016 Ifop survey, as it provides the puzzle this paper attempts 
to clarify (see Ifop, 2016a, p. 58). In some parts, however, they were slightly expan-
ded in order to encompass prospects that likely possess a direct link with the respec-
tive responses. This should be reasonable to expect for those prospects reported in 
the media which, in congruence with the survey, address the political and institutio-
nal future of the EU in the context of Brexit and can be categorized as either integra-
tion optimistic or skeptical. If a link appeared refutable in a given case, the prospect 
was not included in order not to mitigate the results of the analysis. This applied, for 
instance, to anticipations relating solely to the economic situation in the EU. 
The first frame hypothesized and examined in the present study was titled revival-
opportunity frame. Reports employing this frame emphasize the potential of revivi-
fying European integration after the referendum and effective Brexit and are domi-
nated by claims for, or the possibility of, furthering, advancing or improving the Eu-
ropean Union through political reforms. An example for such a report could be an 
article quoting, above all, europhile politicians campaigning for an increased alloca-
tion of competences to the European level or highlighting the potential for a demo-
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cratic reform of the Union’s institutional framework. Under any circumstances, this 
first frame reflects a more optimistic or, at least, forward-looking perspective as re-
gards the political future of the European Union. Its formulation is largely based on 
the strengthening prospect stated in the Ifop survey’s first response option, which 
was expressed to a greater extent by German than by French respondents (Ifop, 
2016a, p. 58). On the basis of this finding, the frame is expected to a greater intensity 
in German, in contrast to French, reporting. 
The second frame hypothesized is referred to as the gridlock-dismantling frame. Re-
ports with this frame focus either on a potential paralysis in European integration 
after the referendum or effective Brexit, for instance because decisions for improving 
the EU are rendered impossible due to internal disputes, or even a regression of the 
European integration process, for example because of further countries leaving the 
EU. Such a framing reflects a more EU pessimistic or turning-back perspective. Des-
pite some theoretically derived additions, it is largely based on the Ifop survey’s 
disappearance response option, stated to a greater extent by French than by German 
respondents (see right columns in ch. 3.1). Therefore, it is anticipated to have been 
more pronounced in French than in German media coverage, hereby possibly explai-
ning the differences in regards to this response. 
As can be inferred from both frames’ descriptions, no difference is made between 
prospects after the Brexit vote and the effective Brexit in the frames. This may initi-
ally seem odd, as the Ifop survey only asked for citizens’ expectations in regards to 
the latter. However, it is notably due to an observation from a short preliminary ana-
lysis showing that media reports rarely make a trackable distinction between the 
two, rendering the attempt for a differentiation artificial and likely inaccurate. 
In addition, whether a report draws up a prospect for the EU after the referendum or 
after the effective Brexit can hardly be expected to have a differential effect on the 
expectations reported in the survey. While plans to change the EU may be presented 
earlier, the implementation of most of them will probably take until the effective 
Brexit anyway. It therefore suffices, in order to maintain the possibility of evincing a 
potential link between the frames and the Ifop survey, to postulate that the media 
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reports associate the future prospects for the EU in some way with the Brexit decisi-
on. The following table summarizes the key characteristics of the two frames: 
Two elements of criticism, in particular, may be voiced against the frames theorized. 
First, readers may criticize the frames’ configurations and specific descriptions as 
they are not based on existing literature or prior findings, but mainly rest on the au-
thor’s considerations. While this reproach is generally justified, it must be acknow-
ledged that it is standard procedure in framing studies to develop one’s own frame 
descriptions and operationalizations in cases where previous research is, as in the 
present context, not available (see e.g. Schuck & De Vreese, 2006, p. 13). 
In addition, as has been explained, the frames do in fact have an empirical basis, na-
mely the Ifop survey they are expected to elucidate. In any way, however, this paper 
does neither stipulate from the outset that the frames are without doubt found in 
the media in the precise configuration reported, nor does it lay down with certainty 
that both frames have an impact. Instead, both of these considerations are subject-
matters of examination that will be assessed in the course of the paper. 
Second, criticism may be raised against the frames themselves. Notably Leeper and 
Slothus (2015) have argued that many studies have confounded framing, defined as 
the act of “highlighting and emphasizing information and beliefs already present in 
a debate or the public’s minds“ (p. 5) with the action of providing new or additional 
“substantive information and arguments“ (p. 3). Following this line of thought, the 
two “frames“ hypothesized in this paper may rather fall into the second category, as 




emphasis on a potential revivification 
of European integration
• chance for institutional reforms 
• trigger for a European army
gridlock- 
dismantling frame
emphasis on a potential paralysis in 
or regression of European integration
• threat of other exits or referenda 
• incapacity to reform and improve
Table 1: The two main media frames examined 
source: own table
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future European integration are already known to the public. Nevertheless, this very 
restricted definition of framing proposed by Leeper and Slothus is in no way undis-
puted in literature. As mentioned above, multiple approaches and definitions co-
exist, none of them being unambiguously better suited than the others. 
It therefore suffices to specify at this point that the definition underlying the present 
paper, conceiving frames notably as patterns of interpretation which select and em-
phasize some aspects of reality while ignoring others, does not explicitly exclude 
that new information and arguments are also presented (Kühne, 2015, p. 25). To fi-
nalize this section, it may be useful to provide some additional information on the 
specific nature of frames examined in this paper, as this will allow for a simpler com-
parison with previous framing studies. 
First, frames have been divided into cognitive and textual frames (Scheufele, 2004, p. 
30). While cognitive frames are individuals’ personal frames in thought and refer to 
the “cognitive understanding of a given situation“ (Sheafer & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010, 
p. 207), textual frames are frames in communication, particularly examined as struc-
tures of media reporting. The present study primarily investigates the second type of 
frame. In doing so, however, it attempts to draw inferences about potential effects on 
citizens’ expectations, which could be considered cognitive frames. 
Second, as regards more specifically textual and media frames, distinctions have 
been made between formal and content-related frames (Matthes & Kohring, 2004, 
pp. 41-43). While the first type is more abstract and regards the general composition 
and presentation of a text, the second type of frame focuses on the actual substance 
and information presented in a communicating text. As can be inferred from the 
frames’ descriptions presented, the latter are examined in this analysis.  
Third, a further subdivision can be made between generic and issue-specific frames. 
While both types are related to the content of a communication, generic frames are 
conceived as universal and superordinate motives such as morality, ethics or pro-
gress that are reflected in a text (Potthoff, 2012, pp. 20-21). On the other hand, is-
sue-specific frames are only found in a particular topic area. As the precise frames 
hypothesized in this paper are exclusive to the field of European integration, only 
Framing the Future of European Integration after Brexit !17
the second type of frame will be examined. Finally, especially as regards effects, 
framing studies have been divided into equivalency and emphasis framing studies.  
The first type analyzes frames that are characterized by “logically equivalent words 
that highlight positive or negative aspects of an issue (e.g. 5% unemployment versus 
95% employment)“ (Kapuściński & Richards, 2016, p. 236), whereas the second type 
analyzes frames offering different perspectives on an issue “without the assumption 
that the information is factually equivalent“ (ibid.). Equivalency is not presumed in 
regards to the frames examined in the present study. 
Having elucidated the theoretical basis and approach, it is now sensible to present 
the methodological design of the analysis, set up to capture and compare the pre-
sence of the two frames in French and German reporting. In this section, information 
will also be provided on the merits and possible limitations of the design selected.  
4 Research design and method 
4.1    Selection of countries, media content and assessment period 
First of all, it is reasonable to set out the geographical scope of the analysis. As has 
been already hinted at, the present study will focus on the two European countries 
Germany and France. This selection is motivated, on the one hand, by the startling 
differences pointed out between the countries in regards to citizens’ expectations of 
future European integration. It is furthermore worthwhile, as France and Germany 
have and will probably continue to play “pivotal roles in shaping Europe“ (Krotz & 
Schild, 2013, p. 1). Finally, in both countries, elections crucial for the future of the EU 
are organized in the year after the referendum, in which expectations as to future 
European integration after Brexit likely play a role (Schick, 2016; Smith, 2016). 
If one compares the circumstances under which news framing and potential media 
influences are investigated in Germany and France, one quickly comes across both 
major similarities and differences. As regards the respective media systems, for in-
stance, researchers repeatedly point out strong resemblances. In one of the most re-
cent global typologies of media systems, incorporating a number of elements from 
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Hallin and Mancini’s approach (2004), Blum (2005) places both countries in the same 
"North European public service model“. According to this model, Germany and Fran-
ce are characterized by extensive media freedom, little political parallelism between 
the media and political parties, a financing of the media assumed by the market and 
the state, and a strong public service orientation of the media (Blum, 2005, pp. 5-6). 
In other areas, however, the presence of significant differences between the coun-
tries cannot be denied. Such dissimilarities span, for example, from the political sys-
tems, Germany being characterized by strong federalism, while France is considered 
a centralistic state, to the economic and societal cultures (Krotz & Schild, 2013, pp. 
3-4; Slomp, 2011, p. 378). Likewise, the citizens’ political orientations in France and 
Germany also differ in important regards. French citizens overall appear to be less 
supportive of the EU than Germans, almost a third stating that their country would 
be better positioned for the future if it was outside of the EU, whereas no more than 
17 percent of Germans share this sentiment (European Commission, 2016, p. 53).  
These considerations illustrate that the investigation of framing effects in Germany 
and France is obviously not conducted against truly identical backdrops, rendering it 
impossible to rule out the entirety of other potential factors which may have also 
played a role in shaping the different expectations. Nevertheless, as both substantive 
theoretical arguments and prior findings strongly point towards a potential media 
influence, it can be expected that the empirical assessment of such an influence will 
yield essential results towards explaining the puzzle provided by the Ifop survey. 
Second, it is necessary to indicate the specific media content analyzed with the aim 
of drawing conclusions on the plausibility of framing effects. In both countries, it 
was decided to examine the reporting in the respective opinion leading quality 
newspapers. In Germany, these papers are the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), in France Le Monde and Le Figaro were selec-
ted (ACPM, 2017; Böhringer, 2017). The decision to analyze the most widespread 
quality newspapers was taken not only because of their large distribution but notab-
ly because they are expected to “exert a key influence on other [domestic] media ac-
tors“ (Helbling et al., 2008, p. 14) and are thus fundamental for shaping the general 
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tone of the media in the respective country. Relating thereto, citizens repeatedly re-
port to rely on mass media as their main source of information about the EU (Azrout 
et al., 2012, p. 693; European Commission, 2016, pp. 190-192). Taken together, the 
four papers are likely to directly or, via other media outlets, indirectly influence citi-
zens’ perceptions even if their readership is declining (Böhringer, 2017). 
A second reason to choose this specific set of papers is the fact that it enables to 
cover the same political media orientations in each of the two countries. While SZ 
and Le Monde are center-left newspapers, FAZ and Le Figaro are generally qualified 
as conservative or center-right papers (Alarcón, 2010, p. 401). This prevents that dif-
ferences in framing detected between France and Germany are merely due to the fact 
that, in each country, papers of only one specific orientation were analyzed, potenti-
ally leading to false conclusions on the countries’ general tone of the media. 
In terms of time, the analysis of media content was determined to cover the first 
week after the announcement of the referendum results. This is above all justified 
because the conduction of the Ifop survey initiated already a few days after the refe-
rendum. Therefore, if an impact of media framing after the Brexit vote is to be esta-
blished as plausible, such a framing has to be identifiable before most citizens were 
questioned. In addition, the first week after the vote is probably also the timeframe 
that most articles covering subject matters relevant to the analysis were published. 
A number of clarifications regarding the retrieval and selection of the material are in 
order. As regards, first, accessing the newspaper content, respective databases for 
each of the papers are used (i.e. LexisNexis for Le Figaro and Le Monde, and the 
newspapers’ own archives for FAZ and SZ). To select the relevant articles in the data-
bases, in an initial step, all reports that include the keyword “Brexit“ and were pu-
blished between 25 June 2016 and 1 July 2016 are scanned. 
Of these, only those articles enter into the final and detailed analysis that include at 
least one clear claim or anticipation regarding the political future of European inte-
gration after Brexit or the Brexit vote that corresponds to one of the two frames out-
lined above. Whether this is indeed the case, is assessed based on a category scheme 
presented in chapter 4.4. Such selection criteria naturally have significant implicati-
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ons for the analysis and should therefore be backed up by theoretical considerations. 
In the present study, the criteria were drawn up, above all, with the objective of focu-
sing the analysis on its main aim. As explained, the study wants to examine a link 
between media framings and the expectations expressed in the Ifop poll. Therefore, 
an inclusion of articles that present much broader or different frames than those de-
veloped based on the survey would dilute the analysis and mitigate its results. 
For instance, the Ifop poll specifically asked respondents about their expectations as 
to European integration in conjunction with Brexit. This explains why articles that 
do not mention the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, inter-
nationally referred to as “Brexit“, are understandably not regarded (Flood, 2016). In 
the same line, it appears reasonable not to include articles focusing solely on pro-
spects for the economic and financial situation after Brexit, mentioning “uncertain-
ty“ as to the future of the European Union or stating that Brexit could “weaken Eu-
rope“ without clearly referring to the European Union. While such articles may be of 
interest to another analysis, their potential link to the Ifop poll results is much less 
evident than for the frames developed based on the survey, entailing that a compari-
son of such media reports in Germany and France would not yield results that are 
very meaningful and informative for explaining the puzzle. 
In closing, it should be added that letters to the editor and press reviews are exclu-
ded from the analysis. This is common for these kinds of studies, as readers do most 
likely not perceive them as integral journalistic components of a newspaper, rende-
ring it implausible that they have the same influence on the public and media out-
lets as other articles (Hilsmann, 1997, p. 44; Reith, 2014, p. 242). Likewise, reports 
published on regional pages or in regional editions were not considered. While all of 
these decisions may certainly be criticized, they appeared necessary to the author in 
order to limit the scope of the study in a reasonable and transparent way. 
4.2    Deductive frame analysis 
So far, it has only been outlined that, at the paper’s core, a frame analysis of newspa-
per coverage is conducted prior and in order to drawing conclusions on the plausibi-
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lity of a potential media impact on citizens’ expectations. The specificities of this 
analysis have, however, up to this point not been explained. Indeed, it is important 
to consider that the term frame analysis itself only describes what is being looked for 
in an element of communication, namely frames, but not which method is used to 
proceed in this matter (Potthoff, 2012, p. 282). 
In consequence, a variety of methodological approaches have been developed and 
applied in earlier studies. As regards the measurement of media frames, in particular, 
Matthes and Kohring (2008) have identified mainly five different approaches: a her-
meneutic approach, a linguistic approach, a manual holistic approach, a computer-
assisted approach, and a deductive approach (p. 259). 
While it would be of little value to present each of these approaches in all their de-
tails in the present paper, it may be useful to address that the methods differ from 
each other notably by reflecting diverging responses to the following questions: Are 
the frames measured inductively or deductively? Are they recorded in a qualitative 
or quantitative manner? Is a manual or a computer-aided coding conducted? Are the 
frames identified directly or as a sum of indicators? And are the units of examination 
entire articles or individual propositions (ibid., pp. 259-263)? 
Each of the methods and underlying decisions naturally has specific assets and 
drawbacks. For instance, those approaches providing “sharp and reliable measures 
may fall short in terms of validity" (ibid., p. 263). The choice of a method must there-
fore depend on the specific research interest pursued in a given analysis (Potthoff, 
2012, pp. 283-284). As the interest of this analysis is to trace previously defined 
frames in newspaper coverage, namely those described above, and not to inductively 
detect new frames in the course of the study, the deductive approach was chosen. 
This approach, for instance applied by Schuck and De Vreese (2004) in their analysis 
of newspaper framing of EU enlargement, is characterized by the coding of theoreti-
cally derived frames in a content analysis. According to Matthes and Kohring (2008), 
it offers advantages in terms of objectivity and reliability but is “quite inflexible 
when it comes to the identification of newly emerging frames“ (p. 263; also Matthes 
& Kohring, 2004, p. 60). The latter does, however, not undermine the present study, 
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as its aim is not to comprehensively reveal elements of all potential frames included 
in the articles but to focus on the specific frames that may elucidate the Ifop survey. 
Perhaps a more serious criticism may concern the risk that a deductive method could 
not allow for an accurate capturing of the frames expected. Most notably, even if 
perspectives of revival and dismantlement were in principle indeed central to the 
coverage of future European integration after Brexit, they might not be correctly de-
tected in the material because of inadequate operationalizations determined befo-
rehand. The paper will at least attempt to reduce this risk by applying a qualitative 
method of analysis, the benefits of which are explained in the following section. 
4.3    Qualitative content analysis 
The decision for a deductive approach is only the first step in choosing the method 
of any framing study. Above all, in contrast to some of the other methodological ap-
proaches presented above, opting for a deductive design does not determine whether 
a quantitative or qualitative analysis will be conducted (Matthes & Kohring, 2004, p. 
61). In the present study, a decision in favor of a qualitative design was taken. This is 
expected, most notably, to permit a more detailed and in-depth analysis of the mate-
rial examined, as the paper’s aim is not exclusively to count the presence of the 
frames hypothesized (frequency) but also to provide a report on the specific manner 
in which the frames occur in the text and through which statements they are formed. 
More specifically, it was settled, with some adaptions, for the content analytical pro-
cedure of deductive category application, described by Mayring (2000). As a content 
analysis is an empirical method to describe content-related and formal features of a 
text and as media frames can be regarded as such features, content analysis has been 
recognized as a suitable method for capturing frames (Potthoff, 2012, p. 283). The 
procedure of deductive category application, in particular, appears suitable, as it is 
both a deductive and qualitative type of content analysis and therefore corresponds 
to the methodological aspirations outlined in the preceding sections. To provide 
some details, the method works with a system of categories formulated in advance to 
which the passages of a text are assigned (Mayring, 2000, p. 5). 
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In order to guarantee intersubjectivity, “explicit definitions, examples and coding 
rules for each deductive category [are stated], determining exactly under what cir-
cumstances a text passage can be coded with a category“ (ibid.). These definitions 
are combined in a coding scheme that can, if necessary, be revised over the time of 
the analysis. As for the present paper, the purpose of the content analysis consists in 
capturing the frames described, this study’s category system will be largely based on 
the frames’ descriptions outlined in chapter 3.3. 
Especially one major adaption to the standard procedure of deductive category app-
lication is made for the purpose of this analysis. While studies employing the me-
thod usually, at least as an intermediate step, code each sentence or proposition se-
parately, the unit of examination of this study is set to one article. This is due to the 
finding mentioned earlier that reporting needs a clear and consistent tendency to 
have an impact on citizens (Zaller, 1992). The evaluation of single statements wi-
thout consideration for the context is therefore unlikely to yield meaningful results.  
Instead, in the present study, articles are directly categorized as a whole, based cer-
tainly on the specific statements included but also on the emphasis and prominence 
of certain passages and their connection with title and lead sentences. The coding 
rules necessary for these categorizations are provided in the category scheme. Af-
terwards, the articles are furthermore compared with the other articles published on 
the same day in France and Germany respectively, providing a measure for the over-
all consistency of a frame on a day of newspaper coverage. 
4.4    System of categories 
The figure below shows a simplified display of the system of categories used for the 
purpose of the present analysis. A detailed version including coding rules and exam-
ples is attached in Annex I. Some explanations to the system are in order. First, the 
central indicator for the classification of any article is the nature of the main pro-
spect emphasized (I 1). This is the indicator on the basis of which the framing of 
each article is determined. While the category C 1 is linked to the revival-opportuni-
ty frame, categories C 2 and C 3 are assigned to the gridlock-dismantling frame, each 
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of them emphasizing a rather EU pessimistic perspective but with a different focus. 
An article is coded with one of the three categories based both on the claims repor-
ted in the text, for instance a eurosceptic politician calling for other exits, and po-
tential suppositions expressed, for instance an expert or the journalist judging ad-
indicator I 1 “nature of main prospect emphasized“
category short definition mapping to frame
C 1: furthering • exclusive or predominant prospect 
concerns advancing, furthering or 
improving European integration
‣ revival-opportunity frame (b/c clear 
forward-moving perspective after 
Brexit/Brexit vote)
C 2: standstill • paralysis; core message is that major 
improvements or advancements (as 
in C 1) are impossible/very unlikely
‣ gridlock-dismantling frame (b/c 
clear EU pessimistic perspective; no 
moving forward possible)
C 3: regression • decay/dismantlement; exclusive or 
predominant prospect concerns 
rolling back European integration
‣ gridlock-dismantling frame (b/c 
clear EU pessimistic perspective; 
moving integration back)
C 4: mixed • multiple prospects (according to C 1, 
C 2 or C 3) are presented to a similar 
extent without clear prioritization
‣ “mixed frame"
indicator I 2 “main source of dominant prospect evoked “
category short definition
C 1: journalist • authoring journalist’s considerations/evaluations are the central 
elements yielding the dominant prospect (as coded in I 1)
C 2: politician • politicians’ statements/claims/proposals are the central elements 
yielding the dominant prospect (as coded in I 1) 
C 3: expert/other • experts’ or others’ assessments are the central elements yielding 
the dominant prospect (as coded in I 1)
indicator I 3 “specific prospects mentioned“
category short definition
C 1: more exits/ref. • other exits from EU or referenda to exit EU
C 6: more eco/soc • more integration/cooperation in economic/social areas
C 11: €-zone more int. • more integration in/of eurozone (e.g. euro-minister of finance)
… (for a full list see Annex 1)
Table 2: The category system (simplified) 
source: own table
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vances in European integration very likely. If only one of the prospects stated in the 
three categories is mentioned, the article is coded with this category. If more than 
one prospect appears, an evaluation of the dominant perspective is performed, based 
on the prominence of each of the perspectives, the title, as well as first and last sen-
tences. The article is then coded with this prevalent prospect. 
If no one perspective can be singled out as dominant, the article is assigned to a 
fourth “mixed“ category. Justifiably, the step of selecting a dominant prospect can be 
contested, notably because a last discretion in determining the selection will always 
persist even if the rules are stated in a very explicit way. However, the inclusion of a 
fourth category for articles that indeed present multiple prospects to the same 
extent, as well as the qualitative manner of analysis, permitting to add notes for dif-
ficult articles that can be picked up later, should relativize such criticism. Finally, as 
explained above, if a given article does not correspond to any of the categories of the 
indicator, and thus to the frames, the article is not regarded in the final analysis. 
To supplement the first indicator, two additional indicators were generated in order 
to facilitate a more detailed analysis of the framings in French and German media 
coverage. First, the indicator I 2 mainly serves to trace the origin of the frames de-
scribed. As has been mentioned in the theoretical part, media framing might well be 
shaped by politicians’ framings, especially in a case such as Brexit and European in-
tegration. On the other hand, it is possible that the journalists themselves take the 
initiative and present their estimations and demands. Finally, they may also quote 
experts, such as political scientists, or other sources. 
Second, the indicator I 3 allows for a more lucid investigation of the specific pro-
spects mentioned in the individual articles. In contrast to the other indicators, the 
categories for this indicator were largely not specified before the analysis but devel-
oped and adapted over the course of the first codings to maintain as much informa-
tion in the analysis as possible. With the same goal in mind, the general rule of assi-
gning any one material exclusively to one of the categories was loosened for this 
third indicator. This is acceptable, above all, because the categorizations of articles 
based on I 3 and I 2 are not intended to be interpreted by themselves. Instead, results 
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from both indicators will serve as bases of information for a qualitative evaluation of 
the frames measured by means of indicator I 1. This will become clearer in the fifth 
chapter, in which the results are presented and discussed. 
4.5    Central limitations of the research design 
Before proceeding in this manner, however, it appears appropriate to recall that the 
rather descriptive frame analysis performed in this study is only an intermediate 
step in attempting to draw conclusions on potential media impacts. The goal of this 
paper remains to elucidate the differences in expectations between French and Ger-
man citizens as demonstrated in the 2016 Ifop survey. Media framing was chosen as 
the parameter the plausibility of a potential impact of which is assessed. 
However, such a research design is naturally exposed to fundamental criticisms, 
most notably because it is unable to establish and prove, in any way, a link between 
both phenomena. Although, as outlined in chapter 3.2, both theoretical considerati-
ons and prior empirical, and in part even experimental, findings point towards a li-
kely media influence in the given context, the paper will not be able to rule out all 
other potential explanations. Therefore, even if similarities between media framing 
and expectations are detected, this finding would not automatically imply causality. 
At its best, the paper will thus only be able to point out that an effect is plausible. 
This would be the case in the given study (1) if the media framing of future European 
integration is found to substantially differ between Germany and France and (2) if 
the nature of the differences corresponds to the results of the Ifop poll. 
5 Results 
5.1    Initial overall findings 
In this section, the results of the frame analysis and their implications for the plau-
sibility of a media impact on citizens’ expectations are presented. To begin with, 
some measures concerning the entirety of media reporting may be of interest. First, 
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it can be noted that over the week-long assessment period, a total of 220 articles in 
the four newspapers were detected that correspond to the selection criteria outlined 
above. Accordingly, these 220 articles addressed subject matters expected to be lin-
ked to the Ifop survey results and could thus be coded with either the “furthering“, 
“standstill“, “regression“ or “mixed“ categories of the scheme. 
This first measure indicates that the categories hypothesized, and thus also the 
frames described by them, were indeed clearly present in German and French media 
reporting after the UK referendum. Per day of newspaper coverage, an average of 37 
articles was published in the four newspapers that permitted a categorization, this 
figure being substantially higher in the first days after the Brexit referendum. 
Judged from the number of articles coded with each of the categories, the revival-
opportunity and the gridlock-dismantling perspectives were overall represented to a 
quite similar extent. 42.3 percent of all articles in Germany and France featured a re-
vival-opportunity frame, measured by means of the “furthering“ category of the first 
indicator, and 38.6 percent featured a gridlock-dismantling frame, as described by 
the categories “standstill“ and “regression“. The remaining 19.1 percent were “mi-
xed“ articles, including characteristics of both frames to the same amount.   
Figure 2: Summary of preliminary overall findings 
source: own illustration; data from Annex 2
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If one considers the presence of the frames over time, an interesting pattern is iden-
tifiable. While the gridlock-dismantling frame is dominant in the papers’ first two 
editions published after the announcement of the referendum results, its share is 
sharply smaller in editions three, four and five, before rising again in the sixth editi-
ons. Inversely, the proportion of the revival-opportunity frame constantly rises up to 
the fourth edition, before dropping again in the last editions analyzed. 
While this trend cannot be explained down to the last detail, it appears to be linked 
in large parts to the space the newspapers provided for claims of eurosceptic politi-
cians. Especially in their very first editions after the Brexit vote, both French and 
German newspapers provided a very prominent space to proponents of a domino ef-
fect, like Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. The claims of these politicians were pre-
sented in entire articles, often without any evaluation put forward by the journalist. 
The share of such articles, on the other hand, decreased in subsequent editions. 
As regards overall results from the indicators of main sources (I 2) and specific pro-
spects (I 3), it should be repeated that their main objective is not to provide insights 
by themselves, in isolation, but to serve as reference points for the qualitative com-
parison of frames between Germany and France. Nevertheless, a brief statistic for 
these indicators can be provided here. Concerning the frames’ main sources, most 
articles’ frames overall were found to be based on statements or proposals of politi-
cians (47.8%). To a smaller extent, journalists’ assessments were also of importance 
in shaping the frames (32.6%). On the other hand, only a smaller number of articles 
were greatly influenced by comments of other sources, such as experts (19.6%). 
Regarding the specific prospects (indicator I 3), a variety of options was mentioned. 
Some of the most recurrent categories developed in the course of the analysis related 
to further exits of other countries, the dissolution of the European Union, more eco-
nomic and social cooperation, more foreign and security cooperation, an increased 
integration within the eurozone, general reforms to the European Union, and a more 
democratic and transparent institutional system (for a full list, see Annex I). More 
detailed and comparative insights regarding the specific prospects will be provided 
in the sections of qualitative evaluation. 
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5.2    Frequency comparison of frames in Germany and France 
According to the central expectations of this paper, the revival-opportunity frame 
should be found to have been more pronounced in German than in French reporting, 
whereas the inverse is expected to have been the case in regards to the gridlock-dis-
mantling frame. If one considers, first, the simple quantitative measure of relative 
frequency based on the number of articles coded with the respective categories, the 
results are consistent with this expectation. 
While 45.7 percent of the relevant articles in German newspapers adopted a revival-
opportunity frame, this was only the case for 39.1 percent of French reporting. Inver-
sely, 46.1 percent of French newspaper articles corresponded to the gridlock-dis-
mantling frame, while the same was true for only 30.5 percent of German articles. In 
both Germany and France, the share of the gridlock-dismantling frame can be attri-
buted largely to the “regression“, in contrast to the “standstill“, perspective. Fur-
thermore, it can be observed that reporting in Germany was overall more ambiguous 
than in France, a fourth of all articles having employed a mixed frame. 
If one takes a more detailed look at these basic statistical measures, one finds the 
observations to remain valid even if one considers the newspapers individually. Both 
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Figure 3: Shares of the frames in German and French media coverage 
source: own illustration; data from Annex 2
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share of articles with a revival-opportunity frame than each of the French newspa-
pers (FAZ: 44.8%, SZ: 47.4%, Le Figaro: 39.7%, Le Monde: 38.6%). Inversely, they also 
published a lower share of articles with a gridlock-dismantling frame (SZ: 23.7%, 
FAZ: 34.3%, Le Figaro: 39.7%, Le Monde: 52.6%). Furthermore, if the frames’ shares 
are examined in the course of time, thus in each edition separately, the general fin-
ding also remains unaffected. In five out of the six editions published in the week 
after the announcement of the referendum results, the proportion of the revival-op-
portunity frame was higher in German than in French newspaper issues, and in all 
six editions, the share of the gridlock-dismantling frame was higher in France: 
On the grounds of the basic quantitative measures collected, the main expectation 
can thus, in the first instance, be sustained. The revival-opportunity frame was inde-
ed, based on the number of articles coded with the categories, represented to a grea-
ter extent in German than in French reporting. The inverse, on the other hand, is 
true for the gridlock-dismantling frame. Furthermore, it can be noted that the diffe-




e.1 (25/6/16) 36.1 % 24.0 %
e.2 (27/6/16) 52.6 % 36.7 %
e.3 (28/6/16) 38.9 % 50.0 %
e.4 (29/6/16) 73.3 % 52.6 %
e.5 (30/6/16) 38.5 % 30.0 %




e.1 (25/6/16) 38.9 % 56.0 %
e.2 (27/6/16)* 36.8 % 50.0 %
e.3 (28/6/16) 22.2 % 36.4 %
e.4 (29/6/16) 20.0 % 36.8 %
e.5 (30/6/16) 23.1 % 40.0 %
e.6 (1/7/16) 25.0 % 55.6 %
The remaining percentage of each edition are mixed frames.             *Le Monde published its second edition after the 
announcement of the referendum results on 26/6; on the other hand, Le Monde did not publish an edition on 27/6.
Table 3: Frames in German and French media coverage over time 
source: own table; data from Annex 2
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rences between news reporting in the two countries are overall more pronounced in 
regards to the gridlock-dismantling frame than as concerns the revival perspective. 
Finally, the figures indicate that the revival-opportunity frame was generally the 
dominant perspective in Germany, as this frame was overall more pronounced than 
the gridlock-dismantling frame in national reporting. On the other hand, in the same 
sense, the gridlock-dismantling frame was the primary frame in French reporting. 
5.3    Qualitative findings substantiating the expectations 
In this section, the findings relating to frequency will be complemented by more de-
tailed insights from a qualitative angle. These appear very valuable in the given case 
as the measures outlined above only provide information about the amount but not 
about the quality and specific composition of the frames detected. On the other 
hand, qualitative insights always run into danger of reflecting personal perceptions 
of the author and are often difficult to review. This is particularly so if, as in the pre-
sent case, a relatively large number of articles are included in the analysis. 
Therefore, to guarantee the greatest possible transparency and traceability, all fin-
dings presented will be substantiated with evidence from the articles. For simpler 
retrievability, these are hereafter cited with title (in single quotation marks), date 
(day/month, all dates 2016) and newspaper (abbreviated). Furthermore, the insights 
will be based mainly on three questions, answers to which were deliberately pursued 
by means of the three indicators introduced: (1) How clearly and unequivocally did 
articles in both countries present prospects towards future European integration, (2) 
which sources played important roles in the framings, and (3) which differences can 
be noticed as regards the more detailed levels of prospects mentioned? 
The table given below summarizes the main findings resulting from these considera-
tions. To facilitate the interpretation of the insights in regards to the research ques-
tion, the results were grouped (a) into findings substantiating the expectations and 
initial quantitative results, and (b) into findings possibly contradicting them. As re-
gards the first group, one can notably remark that French articles were generally 
substantially clearer and less equivocal in presenting disintegration prospects than 
Framing the Future of European Integration after Brexit !32
German newspaper articles. A suitable example to illustrate this is the coverage of 
UKIP politician Nigel Farage’s speech after the referendum, as papers in both coun-
tries reported on it but in a remarkably different manner. The two respective articles 
in French newspapers, one of them in Le Monde (‘Nigel Farage, vainqueur escamoté‘, 
25/6), the other in Le Figaro (‘Nigel Farage s'érige en fossoyeur de l’Europe‘, 25/6), 
notably picked up Farage's prediction and desire that Brexit is only the first domino 
in Europe and that the EU is dying. This statement is quoted without any confronta-
tion against competing expectations or claims: 
“’L'Union européenne est en train de mourir’, a jubilé le leader du parti antieuro-
péen et anti-immigration Ukip, après avoir ’rêvé que l'aube se lève pour un Royau-
me-Uni indépendant’. ’L'UE est en train d'échouer, l'UE est en train de mourir’, a-t-
il ajouté.“ (‘Nigel Farage s'érige en fossoyeur de l’Europe‘, Le Figaro, 25/6) 
On the other hand, the main article published in German newspapers on the same 
speech (‘Bestürzung in Europa über Brexit-Entscheidung‘, FAZ, 25/6), indeed quotes 
the same passage but confronts it with both the joint declaration of the presidents of 
the European institutions stating that the Union will stand together, and a statement 
substantiation/illustration (ch. 5.3) potential challenges (ch. 5.4)
• disintegration prospects overall clearer and 
less challenged in French reporting; more con-
frontations in German articles
• disintegration perspective in many French arti-
cles based on only small passages that are not 
dominant in the articles
• integrative/reform prospects in German re-
porting occasionally complemented by exclu-
sion of disintegration; not existent in France
• articles with the revival-opportunity frame in 
France address reforms/integration that are 
distinctly more far-reaching than in Germany
• repeated substantiations of domino effect by 
means of referring to experts in French re-
porting; considerably less in Germany
• German articles with the revival-opportunity 
frame often explicitly exclude more integration 
that would truly strengthen the EU
• French articles often shaped by possibility/
claims that own country will leave the EU; insi-
gnificant perspective in German reporting
• potential for reforming the EU more pro-
minently dismissed as unrealistic in French 
than in German newspaper coverage
Table 4: Main qualitative insights 
source: own table; based on Annex 2
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of the German president Joachim Gauck arguing that Brexit is not the end of the EU 
but the beginning of new efforts to defend the Union and its values: 
“Er werde auf diesem Treffen vorschlagen, eine ‘weitreichende Reflexion über die 
Zukunft der Union’ zu beginnen […] Beide hatten für einen neuen Kurs der EU plä-
diert […] ’Der bevorstehende Austritt der Briten aus der Europäischen Union ist 
nicht der Anfang vom Ende der Europäischen Union, sondern er ist der Anfang von 
neuen Bemühungen um die Verteidigung der Europäischen Union und ihrer Werte.’“ 
The German article hereby conveys a more mixed or, considering the prominence 
and frequency of the prospects mentioned, even EU optimistic picture. This illustra-
tes that even with a similar base material, in this case Farage’s speech, German and 
French newspapers sometimes take a different approach. 
A similar difference between French and German reporting can be noticed if one 
considers those articles focussing specifically on the prospect of a domino effect. In 
addition to confronting the possibility of this effect with alternative hypotheses and 
claims, several German articles also expressly put into question the likelihood of 
such a prospect. For instance, the article ‘Zurück in die Zukunft‘ published in the 
Süddeutsche Zeitung on 28 June 2016 indeed acknowledges long-term threats to the 
Union but states that prompt exits of other countries are very unlikely due to the 
helplessness of the Brexit camp deterring other countries from taking the same step: 
“Vor dem Referendum war viel von möglichen Nachahmereffekten die Rede gewe-
sen. Die Hilflosigkeit des Brexit-Lagers wirkt nun vermutlich abschreckend genug. 
Das britische Beispiel bringt die EU nicht um – die Distanz vieler Bürger zur Union 
auf Dauer womöglich schon.“ 
Similar reasonings can be found in articles published in the FAZ, for example ‘Zwi-
schen Himmel und Hölle‘ (25/6) and ‘Fahnenflucht‘ (1/7), while no comparable arti-
cles were found in French media coverage. On the contrary, the respective reports in 
French newspapers even tend to substantiate claims or suppositions of other exits, 
notably by referring to experts. The following examples are archetypical: 
“Le risque d'un effet domino sur d'autres pays de l'Union a été souligné par les ex-
perts.“ (‘Le poids des 27 dans le monde va s’éroder‘, Le Figaro, 25/6) 
"Les experts redoutent le risque d'un effet domino du Brexit.“ (‘Washington perd sa 
tête de pont dans l’UE‘, Le Figaro, 25/6) 
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Frequently, such phrases are interspersed more or less incidentally and do not play a 
central role in drawing up a frame. Nevertheless, they are susceptible of enhancing 
the credibility of disintegration prospects and may thus render an influence on citi-
zens’ expectations more probable. In German reporting, on the other hand, these 
kinds of phrases are clearly less pronounced, although they cannot be said to be ent-
irely absent (see e.g. ‘Die Unsicherheit an den Börsen bleibt‘, SZ, 27/6). 
In a similar manner, taking a closer look at the specific prospects mentioned (indica-
tor I 3), German articles are much less than French articles shaped by the possibility 
or claim that the own country may leave the European Union. In France, the vast ma-
jority of newspaper editions include at least one article addressing a potential “Frex-
it“, signifying a French withdrawal from the EU. 
In the German press, a German exit is hardly ever subject to discussion (for a promi-
nent exception, see ‘Tränen der Führung‘, FAZ, 25/6). Instead, more articles refer 
more generally to further decay and divisions or exits of other countries: 
“Damit der Brexit nicht auch Europa spaltet, müssen die Staats- und Regierungs- 
chef jetzt schnell für Klarheit sorgen.“ (‘Bestimmt ins Ungewisse‘, SZ, 28/6) 
“Obama kann freilich das Brexit-Votum nicht allzu sehr herunterspielen, da ihm 
auch daran gelegen ist, dass die EU nicht noch weiter auseinanderbricht.“ (‘Aushar-
ren am Ende der Warteschlange’, FAZ, 28/6). 
While this may be comprehensible, given that the intent to leave the EU tends to be 
more prominently represented by politicians and the public in France than in Ger-
many, the more precise and tangible prospect of an exit of the own country may be 
more influential in shaping expectations of disintegration than the rather abstract or 
remote prospects reported in the German press. 
As a final observation, whereas possibilities or claims for reforming the EU are repor-
ted quite heavily both in France and Germany, they are to a greater extent dismissed 
as unrealistic in French newspaper coverage. In quantitative terms, this finding was 
already indicated by the greater frequency of the “standstill“ category in French 
newspaper coverage. However, a more detailed look appears worthwhile. Most nota-
bly, the closer examination reveals that both French and German articles frequently 
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mention that different approaches as to how the EU should be reformed exist. Howe-
ver, the French articles often present this observation in a way that any agreement 
and common reform appears impossible. An illustration is provided by the article 
‘L'Europe paralysée face aux défis du ’Brexit’', published in Le Monde: 
“Les dirigeants européens se retrouvent les 28 et 29 juin à Bruxelles, mais leurs ré-
ponses divergent […] Rarement la défiance entre Européens aura semblé aussi 
grande […] Y parviendront-ils [à se mettre d’accord sur des projets concrets] ? Rien 
n'est moins sûr.“ (29/6) 
On the other hand, German articles tend to depict a more differentiated picture, 
bringing up areas of dissent, as well as fields in which an agreement is indeed likely: 
“Damit beginne ein neuer Abschnitt in der Geschichte der Europäischen Union: das 
Post-Brexit-Kapitel. Die Frage ist nur, wie dieses inhaltlich gestaltet werden soll. 
[…] Beim Thema Sicherheit gibt es die größten Übereinstimmungen unter den EU-
Staaten. […] Das galt lange Zeit als undenkbar.“ (’27 Länder suchen eine Antwort’, 
SZ, 28/6).
In sum, a number of qualitative findings back or further explain the differences of 
the framings in French and German newspapers, suggested by the quantitative mea-
sure of relative frequency. Nevertheless, some results from the more detailed quali-
tative assessment of the articles also provide for the possibility of challenging initial 
conclusions. The major insights in this regard are presented and discussed below. 
5.4    Qualitative findings contrary to assumptions 
First, if one takes a closer look at the articles categorized, it can be detected that 
much of the coding of French articles with the “regression“ category, and thus the 
gridlock-dismantling frame, is based only on a small passage on future European in-
tegration included in the articles, while most of the text and the central topic of the 
reports is another. For instance, the article in Le Figaro ‘Coup d'arrêt à la folie immo-
bilière londonienne‘ (27/6) actually focuses on the situation in the United Kingdom 
after Brexit but includes a parenthetical passage evoking a potential domino effect: 
“Et surtout, si le scénario du pire se profilait, c'est-à-dire en cas d'effet domino et de 
menace sur la cohésion de la zone euro, Londres pourrait retrouver son statut de 
capitale à part en Europe.“ 
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Similarly, the article ’La croissance européenne fragilisée’, published in Le Monde 
(25/06), deals largely with economic and financial consequences of Brexit and only 
shortly evokes that it poses the threat of nurturing eurosceptic movements in other 
countries of the EU, which could end in an existential crisis of the eurozone (for fur-
ther examples, see e.g. ’Nigel Farage, vainqueur escamoté’, Le Monde, 25/6 and ’Juli-
an Fellowes, guide des bonnes manières’, Le Figaro, 1/7) 
In accordance with the coding scheme, these articles were assigned to the “regressi-
on“ category and counted in the same way as articles in which a potential breakdown 
of the EU was a far more prominent topic. This may lead to the reproach that the 
proportion of the “regression“ category, and thus the gridlock-dismantling frame, is 
overestimated in the case of French reporting, posing a challenge to the quantitative 
findings. The pertinence of such an argument will be discussed below. 
Second, looking more precisely into the specific prospects mentioned, German arti-
cles framed in the way of revival-opportunity tend to present less ambitious pro-
spects as regards European integration than articles of the same category published 
in France. Most importantly, while articles in FAZ and SZ frequently emphasize the 
need and possibility for reforms and are thus justifiably coded with the “furthering“ 
category, they do so strikingly often in combination with the assertion that such re-
forms cannot go into the direction of more integration. Instead, articles often evoke 
the prospect of a better Union achieved without giving more competences to the Eu-
ropean level. The following example provides an illustration: 
“Nicht ‘mehr Europa’ sei das Gebot der Stunde, sondern eine Debatte über ein ’an-
deres Europa’, sagte Gabriel auf der ersten von vier Regionalkonferenzen der SPD 
zur Vorbereitung des Bundestagswahlkampfs in Bonn. (’Gabriel fordert Bekämp-
fung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in der EU’, FAZ, 27/06)
Articles published in the French newspapers, on the other hand, often go further. If a 
revival-opportunity frame is presented, this frame is likely to involve claims or po-
tentials for more Europe, involving for instance an increased harmonization in diffe-
rent policy levels (e.g. ’Pour David Assouline, le 49-3 n'est jamais une bonne soluti-
on’, Le Figaro, 30/6), a strengthening of the eurozone (e.g. ’Alain Minc : Paris et Ber-
lin devraient aider Londres à ne pas quitter l'UE’, Le Figaro, 29/6) or an increased EU 
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budget (e.g. ’Un budget commun pour des projets communs’, Le Monde, 30/6). The-
refore, one could argue that the quantitative gap between France and Germany as 
regards the perspective of moving the EU forward is compensated by a qualitative 
gap in favor of French reporting. For both of the findings and consequential inter-
pretations presented, the qualitative assessment indeed presents a strong case. 
However, different interpretations of the insights also appear possible. 
As regards, first, the comparably short passages in French reporting provoking a co-
ding of the entire article with a gridlock-dismantling frame, one could reply that it is 
not established that articles in which the frame spans over the whole text have a 
higher potential of influencing readers’ attitudes. As has been mentioned, the power 
of framing has been theorized to come “from its ability to define the terms of a deba-
te without the audience realizing its taking place“ (Tankard, 2001, p. 97) and this 
may even be more likely if frames are not too dominant in a given communication. 
As regards the second finding, the more intensive and wide-reaching integration 
prospects predominantly found in French news coverage could indeed lead French 
citizens to be more optimistic as to European integration than Germans. However, 
the inverse may also be true. Citizens are likely to expect that very extensive reforms 
are also more difficult to put into place. Therefore, if they are informed only little 
about alternative reforms that may be less complicated to enforce, they may general-
ly consider reforms for advancing the EU improbable. In France, this is furthermore 
reinforced by the higher share of articles that explicitly consider EU reforms unlikely 
(see “standstill“ category). Thus also in this regard, a counterargument does not ap-
pear unreasonable, permitting the presented results to be overall maintained. 
5.5    Plausibility of a media impact 
As has been demonstrated, both the central quantitative and main qualitative results 
correspond to the expectations formulated at the outset. Media reporting in France 
and Germany appear to have indeed been marked by substantial differences in re-
gards to the framing of future European integration, German news coverage emer-
ging overall as more optimistic towards the future of the EU than French reporting. 
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While this finding does not prove an influence of media framings on citizens’ expec-
tations in the two countries, it provides all central prerequisites for presenting an 
argument of plausibility in this direction. As German citizens were considerably 
more likely than French citizens to be faced with media coverage emphasizing a po-
tential revivification of European integration in the context of the Brexit vote, they 
may have developed more optimistic expectations than their French counterparts. 
French citizens, on the other hand, likely came across more pronounced prospects of 
standstill or dismantlement in media reporting than Germans, accounting for higher 
shares of pessimistic EU expectations among the citizens. Such arguments are sub-
stantiated by the quantitative finding that the revival-opportunity frame was even 
the dominant perspective in German reporting, whereas the same was true for the 
gridlock-dismantling frame in France. The media in both countries thus presented a 
relatively clear directional information flow, rendering an influence very likely. 
In terms of the causes of the different framings in German and French media, espe-
cially the qualitative evaluation has indicated that they cannot be plainly attributed 
to divergences of national politicians’ statements. Instead, journalists and media or-
ganizations in both countries appear to have played a central role in provoking the 
differences, either by selecting which of the various actors to quote or by presenting 
predominantly dissimilar suppositions for the future of the EU.  
As has been mentioned, while the present paper can argue with plausibility, it does 
not empirically prove a media influence in the given context. However, some re-
commendations can be provided for studies which may, in the future, pursue such an 
aim. Above all, a more rigorous testing should include an investigation of the sug-
gested link on the individual level, taking into account factors which may limit a 
media influence for parts of the population. This can be expected, for instance, for 
previous knowledge and attitudes towards Brexit and European integration, as well 
as for the amount and type of media consumption of the individuals. 
Furthermore, several theoretical assumptions that the present study could not but 
suppose should be backed up by empirical substantiation. For example, the supposi-
tion that the reporting of the leading quality newspapers indeed shapes the general 
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tone of the national media, and can therefore be used as an indicator for the same, 
should be verified. A follow-up study taking such considerations into account could 
provide more definite conclusions on the relationship suggested in this paper. 
In addition, it may provide answers to findings which cannot be conclusively explai-
ned based on the aggregate data this study has at its disposal. This applies, for in-
stance, to the result that the quantitative gap between France and Germany in rela-
tion to the revival-opportunity frame is considerably less pronounced (difference of 
6.6 percentage points) than the gap in the Ifop survey’s “strengthening“ expectation 
assumed to be linked to the frame (difference of 17 percentage points). 
Nevertheless, the present study has overall provided a fairly sound case for a media 
influence after the Brexit referendum, particularly if one takes into account the limi-
ted possibilities and scope of a bachelor thesis. In doing so, it has established a foun-
dation for further and more in-depth research in this field. 
6 Conclusion 
The present paper seized to shed light on the research question: “Why do expectati-
ons as to the future of European integration after Brexit differ substantially between 
Germany and France and, more specifically, which significance could media framing 
have in explaining this curiosity?“ 
Having performed a frame analysis of media coverage after the Brexit vote, it is pos-
sible to conclude that framing in French and German media is indeed likely to have 
played an important role in causing the differing expectations in both countries. 
Both basic quantitative as well as qualitative indicators hint at substantial variations 
between the framing in leading French and German quality newspapers, presumably 
exemplary for the overall news coverage in these countries. 
The variations demonstrated are largely reflected in French and German citizens’ 
expectations, as reported in a survey conducted after the Brexit vote. Therefore, the 
results, especially in conjunction with several theoretical arguments and prior empi-
rical findings, render a media influence probable. Nevertheless, the study certainly 
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has significant limitations. Most importantly, due to the research design, it was im-
possible to empirically establish and prove a link between both phenomena. 
Other explanations could not be ruled out entirely, implying that the paper could 
only argue by means of theoretical and empirical plausibility. Furthermore, the qua-
litative approach chosen almost always implies shortfalls in terms of reliability and 
objectivity, though they were attempted to be reduced through precise definitions of 
the coding categories and anchor examples. 
Despite these limitations, the study also presents a number of merits, hopefully ma-
king it useful for further research. First, it filled a gap in existing literature, combi-
ning the research areas of framing, European integration, and media influences on 
future expectations. Second, it provided detailed information on the media coverage 
after the Brexit vote, hereby making it valuable even if one retains doubts on the ef-
fect of this coverage. Third, it constituted a base for more quantitative analyses in 
this field, as these may benefit either from the arguments provided in the theoretical 
section or the data generated through the content analysis. 
To carry the present study forward, it would be valuable, on the one hand, to conduct 
an experimental study in order to clarify the link between media framing and citi-
zens’ expectations in the context of European integration and Brexit. On the other 
hand, a subsequent analysis could extend the present study to other countries in the 
European Union in order to explore the scope of this paper’s conclusions. 
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8 Annex 
8.1    Annex 1: Detailed coding scheme 
Indicator 1: Nature of main prospect emphasized 
category definition example coding rules
C 1: furthering • predominant prospect 
concerns advancing, 
furthering or improving 
European integration 
• clear forward-moving 
perspective after Brexit/
Brexit vote 
• focus on reforming the 
EU in political terms (but 
not primarily to reduce/
dismantle the EU)
• “Ja, die Europäische 
Union muss Teile ihres 
Geschäftsmodells neu 
aufstellen, aber sie hat 




• “Wir müssen aber die 
europäische Säule der 
Verteidigung ausbauen“
• coding based on claims and 
suppositions towards future 
• article is coded with C 1 if 
exclusive or predominant 
prospect (based on quantity 
and, when in doubt, title and 
first and last sentences) falls 
into the category 
• an article is not coded with C 1 
if the prospect is only excluded 
(e.g. b/c unlikely)
C 2: standstill • core message is that 
major improvements/
advancements in EU are 
impossible/very unlikely 
• thus, EU will not be able 
to move forward after 
Brexit/Brexit vote 
• reason e.g. discord 
between leaders of EU 
countries
• “Die völlig 
unterschiedlichen 
Reformvorschläge […] 
belegen indes vor allem 
den tiefen inhaltlichen 
Riss, der durch die Union 
geht […] denn große 
Würfe sind auch nach 
der Reflexionsphase 
kaum zu erwarten.“
• coding based on evaluation of 
claims and suppositions 
towards future 
• article is not coded with C 2 if 
merely differing opinions/
proposals on how to reform EU 
are presented; needs discord/
impossibility to move forward 
as core message of article (for 
determination see rules C1)
C 3: regression • predominant prospect 
concerns rolling back 
European integration 
(dismantlement/decay) 
• clear EU-pessimistic 
perspective after Brexit/
Brexit vote (weaken EU) 
• e.g. other exits or 
respective referenda, less 
competences on 
European Union level, 
dissolution of EU
• “l'exemple britannique 
pourrait faire des émules 
en Europe. La réaction 
[…] intègre le risque 
d'une réaction en chaîne 
sur le plan politique, 
avec une montée des 
revendications des 
partis hostiles à l'Europe, 
qui pourrait affaiblir la 
construction 
européenne“
• coding based on claims and 
suppositions towards future 
• predominant prospect (based 
on quantity and, when in 
doubt, title and first and last 
sentences) must fall into C 3 
• if regression is to be achieved 
through reforms, reforms must 
predominantly pursue the 
target of weakening the EU 
• an article is not coded with C 3 
if the prospect is only excluded
C 4: mixed • multiple prospects 
(furthering, standstill 
and/or regression; see 
descriptions C1-3) are 
presented to a similar 
extent in the article 
• no clear prioritization/
ranking apparent
• “Der Front National 
klebt unterdessen schon 
Plakate […] Und nun 
Frankreich  […] Die 
Versuchung ist da, nun 
endlich nachzubessern 
[...] Vertiefung der Euro-
Zone
• coding based on claims and 
suppositions towards future 
• space assigned to the different 
prospects must be similar 
• article is not coded with C 4 if a 
considerable tendency of the 
text towards C 1, C 2 or C 3 can 
be noticed
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Indicator 2: Main source of dominant prospect evoked 
Indicator 3: Specific prospects mentioned 
coding rules for all categories: assignment of an article to multiple categories possible, 
category applies always if the specific prospect is mentioned (also if it is devaluated) 
category definition example coding rules
C 1: journalist • authoring journalist’s 
considerations/
evaluations/comments 
are the central elements 
yielding the dominant 
prospect of the article 
(as coded in I 1)
• “Der weitere Zerfall der 
EU ist also ein gar nicht 
so unrealistisches 
Szenario“
• article is not coded with C 1 if 
central passages are journalist’s 
words but actually only reports 
of others’ statements (e.g. 
claims of politicians -> C 2) 
• journalist's own judgements/
claims necessary
C 2: politician • politicians’ statements/
claims/proposals are the 
central elements 
yielding the dominant 
prospect of the article 
(as coded in I 1) 





• article does not necessarily 
need to quote the politician 
directly; re-narration of a 
statement/proposal suffices 
• but comment must be clearly 
traceable back to a politician
C 3: expert/
other
• experts’ or others’ 
assessments must be the 
central elements 
yielding the dominant 
prospect of the article 
(as coded in I 1) 
• e.g. economic/financial/
political expert, writer
• “Fratzscher [Chef des 
Wirtschaftsforschungs-
instituts DIW] fordert 
daher, die Europäische 
Union zu vertiefen“
• article does not necessarily 
need to quote the person 
directly; re-narration of a 
statement/proposal suffices 
• but comment must be clearly 
traceable back to a person 
• name or function of the person 
is noted while coding
category definition example
C 1: more exits/ref. • other exits from EU or referenda to 
exit EU
• “brauchen wir jetzt auch ein 
Referendum in Frankreich“
C 2: gain EU-scept. • gains for eurosceptic parties or 
more euroscepticism generally
• “wären nur der Treibstoff für 
Euroskeptiker und Rechtspopulisten“
C 3: decay/div/end • further decay of EU, more divisions 
in EU, end of EU
• “wenn die EU jetzt den Zerfall 
verhindert“
C 4: less EU (inst./pol.) • shrinking of EU politically (e.g. less 
competences/powerful institutions)
• “en donnant plus de poids aux 
nations“
C 5: gen. more EU • generally more integration/more EU 
(if more specific: C 6 - C 9)
• "Forderungen nach einer Vertiefung 
der EU“
C 6: more eco/soc • more integration/cooperation in 
economic/social areas
• “doit les unir dans ces domaines, mais 
aussi ceux […] du commerce“
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8.2    Annex 2: Filled schemes for the newspaper articles 
The filled schemes may be downloaded from http://bit.ly/2spwPvF. For reasons of 
convenience, a ZIP file was created containing individual CSV tables for each news-
paper and day of newspaper coverage. 
C 7: more for/sec • more integration/cooperation in 
foreign policy/security/defense
• “amélioration des échanges […] pour 
la lutte contre le terrorisme“ 
C 8: more migr. • more cooperation as regards 
immigration (e.g. EU asylum policy)
• “doit les unir dans ces domaines, mais 
aussi ceux […] de la migration“
C 9: other more EU • other specific area of more EU 
integration/cooperation
• (e.g. Erasmus:) “Super-Erasmus für 
Europas Studenten“
C 10: flex. more EU • more integration for parts of EU 
countries, “flexible Union“
• "Teilgruppe von Staaten vorangehen 
kann und gemeinsame Politiken“
C 11: €-zone more int. • more integration in/of eurozone 
(e.g. eurozone minister of finance)
• “Finanzminister, der in die nationalen 
Haushalte eingreifen dürfe.“
C 12: refo./new EU • generally reforms/new Europe/new 
treaty (= unclear if more or less EU)
• "Brüssel, der Hauptstadt […] Europas, 
das nun ein anderes werden wird?“
C 13: cit. benefits • reforms that show/focus on giving 
benefits to EU citizens
• "dass Europa […] Antworten auf die 
Sorgen der Bürger geben kann“
C 14: more effect. • reforms that make EU more 
effective (more capable to act)
• “L'Europe doit devenir plus 
pragmatique et plus efficace“
C 15: more dem./tr. • reforms that make EU more 
democratic and/or transparent
• "reconstruire un projet démocratique 
et transparent“
C 16: neutr. inst. rf. • reforms that change institutions 
(but unclear if stronger/weaker)
• "cela nécessite de penser à des 
institutions spécifiques“
C 17: other refo. • other specific reforms/
changements to EU
• (e.g. more sovereign EU:) “il appelle à 
un sursaut de souveraineté europ.“
